Takeover target firms covered by more equity analysts are sold for higher premiums while their acquirers earn lower merger announcement returns. We confirm these results using exogenous shocks to coverage arising from brokerage-house mergers or closures (i.e., quasi-natural experiments) as instruments for the loss of analyst coverage. In general, our findings indicate that target coverage by equity analysts materially affects the wealth of all shareholders during acquisitions. Our empirical evidence supports Jensen and Meckling's (1976) theory that security analysts perform an external monitoring role that mitigates managerial agency problems thereby enhancing the wealth of shareholders.
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency costs related to the separation of ownership and control, which manifest in non-value maximizing managerial behavior, are curtailed by monitoring from external financial analysts. Based on this argument, Jensen and Meckling (1976, pg. 355) state: "…we expect the major benefits of the security analysis activity to be reflected in the higher capitalized value of the ownership claims to corporations…" Indeed, because financial analysts review disclosures and track corporate activities to inform the stock market about a firm's current and future prospects, they may facilitate the monitoring of managerial actions that might not be in the shareholders' best interests.
In this paper, we empirically test Jensen and Meckling's monitoring hypothesis in the context of acquisitions. This is an ideal setting to examine this hypothesis because acquisitions are transactions highly vulnerable to agency problems in which the interests of managers and shareholders are not always aligned.
In support of this idea, academic studies suggest that managers of acquisition targets, for example, appear to trade merger premiums for personal benefits (e.g., Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack, 2004) . We examine whether sell-side analyst coverage of takeover targets affects the premiums paid for these firms and the returns to their acquirers using a sample of over 1,000 completed M&A deals between 1993 and 2008.
There is empirical support Jensen and Meckling's theory that equity analysts perform an external monitoring role that improves corporate governance. Yu (2008) , for example, shows that firms with more analysts manage their earnings less and Irani and Oesch (2013) find and inverse association between analyst coverage and the level of information provided in corporate disclosures. Despite this evidence, we recognize that acquisitions are different than the settings considered by Yu (2008) and by Irani and Oesch (2013) because, after deal completion, targets cease to exist as standalone firms and target CEOs often lose their jobs. As a result, top managers of takeover target firms could resist the discipline imposed by external monitoring by putting their personal interests ahead of their shareholders'. 1 1 Moreover, the relation between managers and analysts may affect monitoring by external analysts. Several studies argue that analysts often pressure managers to meet or beat short-term earnings targets at the expense of long-term value maximization, and this may compromise the potential monitoring role exerted by equity analysts on management. See Yu (2008) , for a comprehensive discussion of the literature that documents this pressure.
This suggests that it is not obvious ex-ante that, under the oversight of equity analysts, the incentives of managers of takeover targets are aligned with the incentives of target shareholders. Evidence of effective external monitoring by financial analysts, therefore, should come in the form of improved bargaining by target managers on behalf of their stockholders in the acquisition context. Put differently, under the monitoring hypothesis, target managers should exercise and exhibit bargaining power to negotiate better acquisition terms for their shareholders.
The baseline empirical evidence we present supports the monitoring hypothesis: under analysts' monitoring, target managers appear to bargain for more favorable terms for their shareholders. Specifically, our results indicate that takeover premiums increase with the number of analysts covering the target firm.
This result is economically important: adding one analyst to cover the average sample target is associated with an increase of 0.8 to 1.3 percentage points in the takeover premium. Consistent with these higher premiums paid to target shareholders, acquirers of targets with greater analyst coverage experience lower merger announcement returns. Moreover, using the method proposed by Ahern (2012) we find that, relative to their acquirers, targets covered by more analysts capture a higher share of the acquisition gains.
Relatedly, Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010) show that target companies that initiate their own acquisitions receive lower premiums. We find that the higher the number of analysts covering the target the less likely the target is to initiate its own sale. We also find that merger agreements in deals involving targets covered by more analysts are less likely to include target termination fee provisions, allowing target managers the flexibility to pursue superior acquisition offers for their shareholders.
The lower acquirer returns for bidders (and the higher premiums for their targets) could result from increased (latent or actual) competition to buy targets covered by more analysts. While it is difficult to measure latent competition accurately (e.g., Aktas, et al. 2010) , we can measure the number of potential acquirers that submit public takeover offers. Our results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the number of analysts covering the target is associated with an increase of 1.3 to 2.0 percentage points in the probability of observing a competing bid. This finding is noteworthy since only 4.7% of the deals in our sample involve a competing acquisition bid. The increased competition we uncover is also consistent with our finding of a lower incidence of target termination fee usage by targets covered by more analysts.
We cannot make causal inferences about our baseline results without tests for endogeneity. In our setting, it is conceivable that analysts look to cover firms that are more likely to earn higher premiums upon becoming takeover targets (i.e., have the greatest potential for value improvement under alternative ownership). Under this possibility, causality would run in the opposite direction. Our results could also be biased from unobservable firm heterogeneity correlated with both corporate policies and analyst coverage.
Moreover, although our baseline tests show that targets with more analysts receive higher premiums it is unclear whether losing coverage is detrimental for these firms.
To address these issues, we employ natural experiments involving the mergers and closings of brokerage firms (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010, and Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012) , which produce exogenous variation in analyst coverage. Specifically, we use mergers and closures of brokerage houses to study the probability of losing analyst coverage. In 2SLS analyses, we use the instrumental variable (IV) of coverage loss as the key independent variable in both target premium regressions and acquirer CAR regressions. The results of these tests show that the loss of analyst coverage causes takeover premiums to decrease and acquirer returns to increase. These findings, which are consistent with the evidence from our baseline analyses, are qualitatively unaffected when brokerage-house closures and mergers are used independently to instrument for the coverage loss. Overall, the results from our IV tests imply that target analyst coverage prior to M&A deals has a causal effect on the wealth of both acquirer and target shareholders.
In sum, our results suggest that with greater monitoring by external equity analysts target managers negotiate better acquisition terms for their shareholders. Targets covered by a greater number of analysts are sold for higher takeover premiums, are more likely to receive takeover offers from more than one acquirer, are less likely to initiate their own takeover, and are less likely to commit to pay deal termination fees. Similarly, targets that lose coverage due to exogenous shocks are paid lower premiums while their acquirers earn higher merger announcement returns. These findings, which withstand a battery of robustness tests, are consistent with the view that analyst scrutiny acts as a monitoring device that incentivizes targets managers to bargain for deal terms that are in the best interests of their shareholders. This paper delivers contributions to different strands of the literature. First, our empirical evidence supports the predictions in Jensen and Meckling (1976) that security analysis leads to a higher value of the ownership claims in corporations. Our results also support the prediction in Fama (1990) that monitoring will be conducted not only by a firm's residual claimants (equity and debt holders), but also by their agents (e.g., analysts and auditors). Second, our results also advance the M&A literature by documenting the effect of analyst coverage during acquisitions. To our knowledge, most studies in this literature focus on acquirers but not on targets (as we do here). In this vein, our paper complements the findings in contemporaneous work showing that acquiring firms that experience a reduction in analyst coverage are more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions (Chen, Harford, and Lin, 2014) , documenting that the dispersion in analysts' forecasts for acquiring firms increases during merger waves (Duchin and Schmidt, 2013) , and finding that banks change their stockholdings in the acquirer after a merger announcement when the advising banks' analysts change their recommendations about the acquirer (Haushalter and Lowry, 2011) . More generally, our study is related to the work considering the link between sell-side analysts and firm value (see, for example, Womack, 1996 , Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman, 2001 , Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee, 2004 , Loh and Stulz, 2011 , and Derrien and Kecskes, 2013 .
Third, our paper also contributes to the growing body of research that uses brokerage-house mergers and/or closures as natural experiments that produce an exogenous variation in analyst coverage. Studies in this literature use this exogenous variation to examine whether analyst coverage induces reporting bias (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010) , affects credit ratings (Fong, Hong, Kacperczyk, and Kubik, 2012) , influences firm valuation (Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012) , improves external monitoring (Irani and Oesch, 2013; Chen, et al. 2014) , and deters innovation (He and Tian, 2013) .
The paper continues as follows. Section 1 describes our data. Section 2 presents the main empirical analyses. Section 3 provides a number of robustness tests. Section 4 contains our conclusions. The Appendix defines the key variables we use in this study.
Data
We begin with all M&A transactions announced and completed between 1993 and 2008 respectively. This process yields a final sample of 1,098 completed deals. Our focus on completed deals circumvents the issue that investor reactions may reflect the market's expectations that the transaction will be completed. In this regard, we follow recent studies in the M&A literature that also analyze completed deals (e.g. : Masulis, et al. 2007; Savor and Lu, 2009; Gorton, Kahl, and Rosen, 2009; Lin, Officer, and Zou, 2011; and Chen, et al. 2014 ).
Panel A of Table 1 provides the temporal and (Fama-French 12) industrial distribution of our sample.
The number of transactions increases during periods of economic expansion, peaking around 1998. We observe a decline in deals during the recessions in the early (and late) 2000s. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that stock market health drives merger activity. The temporal distribution of our sample is consistent with their conjecture. Panel A in Table 1 shows that our target companies appear well distributed across several industries, with some clustering in the Business and the Healthcare sectors (29% and 15% of the sample, respectively). Table 1 reports summary statistics for key characteristics of our sample. The Appendix contains the definition of all variables used in the paper. The relative size of the target is approximately 14% of the combined entity. Comparably, Lin, et al. (2011) report a relative size of 15% for the deals they study. Target firms in the deals we examine obtain an average premium of almost 46%, close to the average premium of 47.8% in Officer (2003) .
Panel B of
We read the S-4, DEFM14A, SC-TO, and DEF14A proxies filed with the SEC by the target and/or acquiring firm to obtain information on the party that initiates the deal. In our sample, targets initiate their own sale approximately 39% of the time. By comparison, Fich, Cai, and Tran (2011) find that target firms initiate the takeover in approximately 38% of the cases they study. Approximately 15% of the deals we analyze are tender offers. A competing acquirer makes an alternate, public offer for the target firm in 4.7% of our transactions, on average, and nearly 3% of the deals are characterized as hostile. Roughly one-third of all deals are financed with 100% cash, which is comparable to the 33% of the sample that are all-cash deals in Gorton, et al. (2009) . In many dimensions, the descriptive statistics in our sample appear consistent with those reported in the extant M&A literature.
Since our study is focused on the impact of target analyst coverage on M&A deal terms, we match our sample to Thomson's Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) summary files. Analyst coverage is defined as the number of analysts providing earnings estimates each month, as in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) . For our purposes, we collect the maximum number of sell-side equity analysts providing research coverage on the target firm in any month in the six months prior to the deal announcement month to identify the amount of analyst coverage on the target firms. According to the last two rows in Panel B of Table 1 , approximately 68% (or 746) target firms have at least one analyst providing research coverage during the six months prior to an M&A deal announcement and the median number of analysts covering targets in our sample is two. Comparably, for a sample of over 6,000 firms with a mean value of close to that of our target firms (around $1 billion), Hong, et al. (2000) report that just over 63% are covered by at least one financial analyst and that the median number of analysts in that sample is also two.
Empirical analyses
In this section we investigate whether analyst coverage of target firms affects target premiums, announcement returns for the acquirer, target termination fees, bid competition, and the identity of the deal initiator. We begin by addressing the selection bias related to analyst coverage.
Identification
Existing studies suggest that a selection bias in coverage exists because analysts tend to cover larger companies (Bhushan, 1989) and those about which they have favorable opinions of future prospects (McNichols and O'Brien, 1997) . These issues imply that analysts may favor coverage of larger target firms or those that are poised to earn higher premiums during takeovers. Therefore, without devoting proper attention to the endogeneity of analyst coverage our results will be difficult to interpret. To circumvent this issue, we use natural experiments related to the mergers of brokerage houses (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010) and closures of analyst firms (Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012) .
We note that the variation in analyst coverage related to mergers and closures of brokerage houses is almost surely orthogonal to the gains accruing to our target firms, at the very least because the broker mergers/closures (that affect targets in our sample) occur with no less than a six month lag prior to their acquisition announcement dates. Given this, these experiments provide a reliable source of identification in our setting. Table 2 reports the mergers and closures of brokerage houses during our sample period.
Panel A in
Panel A also reports the distribution of the 5,515 companies that lose coverage as a result of these events.
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From this group, we identify 383 instances in which a firm that loses coverage is one of the target firms in our sample. In all, 165 unique targets in our sample lose at least one analyst due to a brokerage closure or merger. Again, because we ensure that the brokerage event (merger or closure) occurs at least six months prior to the acquisition announcement, the timing mitigates the concern that the takeover event itself triggers the reduction in coverage.
We sort the 746 targets in our sample with analyst coverage during the six-month period prior to the merger announcement by whether they lose coverage as a result of a brokerage merger or closure. We compare mean and median values for key target characteristics in the two subsamples and report the results in Panel B of Table 2 . This analysis reveals that, in all of the dimensions we consider, targets that lose coverage are similar to those that do not lose analysts. This evidence suggests that coverage loss due to brokerage closings or mergers is indeed random and that the reduction in the number of analysts is truly exogenous.
In Panel C of Table 2 , we use a panel of 47,881 firm-year observations with complete data in CRSP, Compustat, and I/B/E/S, to estimate four logistic regressions in which the dependent variable is set to 1 if the firm experiences a loss in analyst coverage during the calendar year. The dependent variable is otherwise set to 0. We compute this variable for each company in every calendar year in which the firm is still active as of the December 31 st of the calendar year. Firms that drop from the sample at any time before this date are removed from the analysis.
The regressions in Panel C of Table 2 , control for explanatory variables similar to those in Mola, et al. (2013) and Yu (2008) . The tests in Panel C include two additional control variables: an indicator for Brokers
Closed and an indicator for Brokers Acquired. If a brokerage firm that covers firm "i" closes during the calendar year, the indicator is set to 1 in that calendar year for company "i". Otherwise, the indicator is set to 0. The Broker Acquired indicator is coded in an analogous manner. Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) and Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) respectively show that these events reduce the number of sell-side analysts that cover a given firm. These results are borne out in our data as well. The coefficient estimates for Brokers Acquired and Brokers Closed exhibit positive and significant estimates indicating that these events trigger a meaningful decline in analyst coverage. The marginal effects derived from model (4) in Panel C of Table   2 indicate that the probability of experiencing a coverage loss increases by 6.19 percentage points when brokers merge and by 7 percentage points when brokers close.
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In the remainder of the paper, we employ 2SLS methods to use mergers and closure of brokerage houses to instrument the analyst coverage loss experienced by the target firms.
5 By doing so, we address endogeneity concerns related to co-determination of coverage and premiums and also to unobservable firm heterogeneity correlated with corporate decisions and analyst coverage.
Analysts coverage and takeover premiums
In Table 3 we report the results from eight regressions in which the dependent variable is the acquisition premium (conditional on an acquisition occurring). In models (1), (2), (5) and (6), the dependent variable is the 4-week acquisition premium reported by SDC, while in the other regressions the dependent variable is the target's cumulative abnormal return (CAR) during the window (-42, +126) where day 0 is the merger announcement day (as in Schwert, 1996) . In the first four tests in Table 3 , the key explanatory variable is 4 The marginal effects are computed by first calculating the probability of losing coverage using the sample means for all continuous independent variables and zeroes for all indicator independent variables (the base predicted probability). The probability of competition is then re-computed by changing each independent variable (in turn) by adding one standard deviation to the mean of continuous variables (or using a 1 for each indicator variable). We use the same procedure to compute marginal effects for all logit models in this paper. 5 A naïve two-stage approach would fit a logit model for the coverage loss in a first stage and then, in a second stage model, use the fitted coverage loss probability from the first stage as the main independent control variable. This approach, however, delivers inconsistent estimators and suffers from the forbidden regression problem described by Wooldridge (2002, p. 236 and p. 478) . To avoid this issue and following Wooldridge's suggestion, we fit the second stage regressions using 2SLS by instrumenting coverage loss with the fitted coverage loss probability from a first stage OLS regression. In addition, in untabulated 2SLS analyses, we estimate the first stage regression to instrument for coverage loss using fiscal years (instead of calendar years). The results of the second stage tests using this alternative instrumentation produce results that are qualitatively similar to those reported.
the number of sell-side analysts covering the target firm. This variable is defined as the maximum number of sell-side equity analysts providing research coverage on the target firm during the six months prior to the announcement of the deal. The key explanatory variable in models (5)- (8) is the fitted probability of coverage loss from a 2SLS system in which the first stage regression is a linear model similar to model (4) in Panel C of Table 2 . 6 This IV approach helps us (i) address the possibility of co-determination of analyst coverage and takeover premiums, and (ii) examine the effect of coverage loss on takeover premiums.
Aside from our independent variables related to analyst coverage, the control variables in our premium regressions (defined in the Appendix) are similar to those used in the extant M&A literature. Importantly, in order to properly specify our second stage regressions, additional controls (some of which are not reported) include those used in model (1) of Panel C of Table 2 . In addition, to account for the influence of industry and time trends on M&A premiums, the odd-numbered regressions in Table 3 include year and industry (Fama-French 12 categories) fixed effects while the even-numbered regressions are estimated with standard errors clustered by industry and year. Controlling for the influence of time trends using different econometric techniques in our tests is particularly important given the time variation in regulatory provisions and other events that affect (a) the flow of information between publicly traded firms and sellside analysts and (b) the population of firms with analyst coverage. 7 Likewise, using different econometric 6 The standard errors in the second stage regression are adjusted for the fact that the instrumental variable for analyst coverage is estimated. See Roberts and Whited (2012) for a discussion of this issue. In addition, to assess the strength of our instruments, we perform tests following Stock and Yogo (2005) and report the associated p-value for the F statistic in all of our second stage regressions. We also estimate Anderson's (1984) likelihood-ratio test of the null hypothesis that the test statistic is distributed χ 2 , so that it may be calculated even for an exactly identified equation. All of our second stage tests report the associated p-values for this test. 7 On August 15, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD). Regulation FD provides that when a firm discloses material nonpublic information to certain individuals or entities (such as stock analysts or holders of the firm's securities who could potentially trade on the basis of the information) the firm must simultaneously make public disclosure of that information. In addition, The Global Settlement was an enforcement agreement reached on April 28, 2003 between the SEC, NASD, NYSE, and ten of the United States' largest investment firms to address issues of conflict of interest within their businesses. Its purpose was to curb conflicts of interest that affected analysts' research by substantially curbing links between research and investment banking departments. The new rules also established rigorous disclosure requirements aimed at making research output more meaningful. According to Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach, (2009) analyst coverage declines following the Global Settlement agreement. methods to account for the influence of the targets' industry affiliation is important given that some sectors (i.e.: Business and Healthcare) appear to be slightly overrepresented in our sample (Table 1) .
The coefficient on the number of analysts covering the target is positive and statistically significant in models (1)- (4) of Table 3 . Based on the estimates from the standard OLS regressions, on average, premiums increase by 0.8 to 1.3 percentage points with the addition of one analyst. The estimates for the instrumented analyst variable in our second-stage premium regressions [Models (5)- (8)] are negative and statistically significant, indicating that target firms that lose coverage experience a large drop in premiums (ranging from 1.9% to 10.7%). These findings suggest that analyst coverage has a causal effect on the premiums paid to firms that are sold. In general, the results from our merger premium tests are consistent with the hypothesis that monitoring by sell-side equity analysts incentivizes managers to bargain for higher merger premiums when their firms become takeover targets. 8 We observe that several of the control variables in Table 3 yield coefficient estimates that are similar to those reported in other studies. For example, we find acquisition premiums to be higher in deals characterized as tender offers (Bates, Lemmon, and Linck, 2006) . In contrast, acquisition premiums are significantly lower in deals initiated by the target (Aktas, et al. 2010 ) and also inversely related to the size of the target firm (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter, 2008) . This last result (of larger targets earning lower premiums) is noteworthy because larger firms are less likely to lose coverage (see Panel C   of Table 2 ). Nevertheless, the positive association between analyst coverage and premiums is robust to the inclusion of the target's size variable in the regressions reported in Table 3 .
The positive association between analyst coverage and premiums suggests that coverage adds value (at least conditional on an acquisition). It is possible that firms in general and potential takeover targets in particular are aware of such value and, therefore, seek to buy coverage. While investment banks provide most research coverage with no explicit costs to firms, there are some independent research firms that provide coverage for a fee to companies. The evidence in Kirk (2011) suggests that coverage is indeed valuable. He estimates positive average CARs (1.68%) for firms that buy coverage and shows that those with greater uncertainty, weaker information environments, and low turnover are more likely to buy coverage as they have the most to gain from analyst coverage but are unlikely to attract sell-side analysts.
In our sample, only six target companies buy coverage. Removing these observations from the analyses does not alter our results. Comment and Schwert (1995) estimate regressions explaining unconditional takeover premiums. These regressions (see Table 4 of their paper) use panel data of all firm-years in their sample period, where the dependent variable (unconditional takeover premium) is set equal to 0 in non-takeover firm-years. The dependent variable is equal to the actual takeover premium if there is a takeover associated with the firmyear. The control variables in their regressions include lagged (relative to the year in question) firm-specific measures of abnormal returns, sales growth, liquidity, debt-to-equity, market-to-book, price-to-earnings, and company size.
Unconditional premiums
In untabulated analyses, we estimate unconditional premium regressions using all firm-years with CRSP, Compustat, SDC, and analyst coverage data in our sample period. Specifically, using 31,517 firmyear observations for which the full set of control variables employed in Comment and Schwert (1995) is available, we run basic OLS regressions of unconditional takeover premiums on the number of analysts covering the target firm.
We find that the effect of analyst coverage on unconditional takeover premiums is positive and significant. Given that the unconditional takeover premium blends the effects of a conditional takeover premium and the probability with which a takeover offer occurs, our results suggest that the number of analysts covering the target firm adds value unconditionally by increasing some combination of the premium conditional on a takeover (as in Table 3 ) and the probability that such a deal occurs.
Natural experiments: Potential issues
In the preceding analyses, we address the selection bias in analyst coverage by exploiting natural experiments related to mergers of brokerage houses (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010) and to closures of analyst firms (Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012) . Specifically, we use these events (which produce an exogenous variation in coverage) as instruments for the loss of analyst coverage because they are (i) likely correlated with such loss (satisfying the relevance condition); and (ii) unlikely correlated with the residual in the target premium regressions (satisfying the exclusion condition).
Nevertheless, because the exclusion restriction cannot be tested it is plausible that the events leading to a consolidation in the Brokerage Industry could have affected some targets in our sample (particularly those operating in the financial industry). We address this concern in two ways. First, we repeat all our tests excluding the 86 target firms in our sample that operate in the Money and Finance industry. The results, excluding these firms, lead to inferences similar to those arising from the tabulated analyses. In our second approach, we re-estimate (but do not tabulate) all of the second-stage tests using the closure of brokerage houses as the sole instrument for coverage loss. The results of these tests are similar to our tabulated findings. The coefficient in the SDC premium regression implies that losing coverage is associated with a deal premium decline.
We also note that the closings of brokerage houses are temporally clustered. This raises the potential issue that many transactions in our sample could be more susceptible to these events than others. To alleviate this concern, we re-estimate all of our second stage regressions using the merger of brokerage houses independently to instrument for the coverage loss. The estimates from these untabulated analyses are consistent with those reported in Table 3 . Moreover, in the robustness tests presented in Section 3 we further address endogeneity concerns by using the identification method proposed by Yu (2008) .
Premiums and ex-ante coverage
Crawford, Roulstone, and So (2012) indicate that analysts initiating coverage on firms without existing coverage produce industry-and market-wide information. Conversely, they argue that analysts initiating coverage on firms with existing coverage produce firm-specific information. Their study suggests that analysts have different roles, and effects, in firms that are covered ex-ante versus those that are not. In our context, this implies that the relation between acquisition premiums and the number of analysts covering a target firm might have a discontinuity around zero (i.e., might be non-linear, and different going from zero to one analyst as opposed to going from one to two analysts).
To investigate this in greater detail, in untabulated analyses we re-estimate our premium regressions for the subsample of 746 deals in which the target firm is covered by at least one analyst (similar in spirit to the regressions in Panel B of Table 3 ). The results indicate that, for the average transaction, increasing coverage by one analyst (from at least one analyst ex-ante) is associated with a significant increase in the SDC premium of 0.8% to 1.2%. A similar increase in the number of analysts is associated with an increase of almost 1% in the Schwert (1996) premium. Thus, for covered firms the association between the number of analysts and realized takeover premiums is larger in magnitude.
Acquirer returns
In Table 4 , we estimate four regressions explaining the three-day merger announcement cumulative abnormal announcement return (CAR) for the acquirers in our sample. This CAR is centered on the acquisition announcement day, and is calculated as the cumulated residuals from a market model estimated during the one-year window ending four weeks prior to merger announcement. We control for variables similar to those in the acquirer return tests performed by Moeller, et al. (2004) and by Masulis, et al. (2007) , except that we expand the specifications in those studies by our target analyst coverage proxies. Specifically, models (1) and (2) report coefficients from OLS regressions in which the explanatory variable of interest is the number of analysts covering the target company. Models (3) and (4) provide estimates from second-stage regressions in which the key independent variable is the coverage-loss instrument obtained from a first stage regression (similar to the procedure used in our premium IV tests). 9 To correctly specify our second stage models, additional controls include all of the independent variables used in model (1) of Panel C in Table 2 . The estimates for some (but not all) of these controls are reported in Table 4 .
The results in models (1)-(2) of Table 4 indicate that acquirer returns decrease in the number of analysts covering the target. According to the OLS coefficient estimates, a one standard deviation increase in the number of analysts covering the target is associated with a 66 basis points decrease in the return to the acquirer. Coefficients from our second-stage regressions of acquirer returns in Models (3)-(4) indicate that acquirer CARs are 4.9 to 5.9 percentage points higher when targets lose coverage. These results also hold when we use closures and mergers of brokerage houses independently to instrument for coverage loss (not tabulated). The coefficient estimates for these untabulated second stage tests are 0.067 (p-value = 0.000; when brokerage mergers is the instrument) and 0.060 (p-value = 0.000; when brokerage closure is the instrument), similar to those reported in Table 4 .
Looking at the control variables in Table 4 , we note that several produce results that conform to the existing literature. For example, as in Masulis, et al. (2007) and Cai and Sevilir (2012) , the relative size variable yields negative coefficient estimates. In addition, similar to many papers in the literature (including Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi, 2012) acquirer returns upon the announcement of the deal are higher when cash is used to buy the target firm.
Together with the findings from our bid premium regressions, our acquirer return tests suggest that analyst coverage serves as an external monitoring device that increases the bargaining incentives of the target managers. Indeed, shareholders in targets covered by more analysts appear to capture more of the gains from an acquisition (higher premiums and lower bidder returns) than do targets with lesser analyst coverage. The opposite, however, occurs when the target's analyst coverage is lost. In the later scenario, acquirers pay lower premiums and earn higher merger announcement returns.
Target-payable termination fees
The existing literature (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Officer, 2003) considers one particular contractual provision in merger agreements (target-payable termination fees) as an efficient solution to the problem of bargaining with potential acquirers. Specifically, to induce a bidder to make a public offer to acquire the target firm at a premium, the target in many cases must offer to pay a termination fee to the acquirer if the target later reneges on the agreed deal. If the incentives created by monitoring from financial analysts increase the bargaining power of some targets (as argued in this paper), those targets with higher analyst coverage may be able to negotiate with potential acquirers without having to agree to pay a termination fee.
In other words, if monitoring by analysts increases target bargaining power we may observe M&A deals in which the target firm receives a high premium (as in Table 3 ) but does not have to offer to pay a termination fee to the acquirer, thereby increasing the target's flexibility to pursue superior acquisition offers for their shareholders. This is what we find.
In Table 5 we report logit (and OLS) regressions explaining the incidence (or size) of target-payable termination fees in M&A agreements. As can be seen from the coefficients in the first row of the table, the number of analysts covering the target firm is significantly negatively associated with both the incidence and size of target-payable termination fees (although the coefficient in column 4 is not significant at conventional levels). According to the estimates from the logit models, increasing target coverage by a single analyst is associated with a 9 to 12 percentage point drop in the probability that the deal contains a target termination fee provision.
To put this result in perspective, about 86% of the deals in our sample include a target payable termination fee. We interpret this as further evidence consistent with the notion that greater analyst coverage enhances the monitoring and, in turn, the bargaining power of the target: targets with greater analyst coverage appear to get higher premiums in M&A deals (Table 3 ) and do so without having to promise a termination fee to the acquirer. An alternative (but entirely consistent) explanation is that some bidders want break-up fees in opaque firms because doing due diligence in these targets might be more costly.
Coverage makes targets less opaque thereby lowering the need for the break-up fees. Under this possibility, the break-up or termination fee results are also consistent with the Merton's (1987) investor recognition theory predicting that investors would be more comfortable buying stocks with which they are familiar.
Competing bids
Our evidence in Table 5 suggests that targets with greater analyst coverage might be more likely to experience competing bids because, at the margin, the lack of a termination fee in a deal is more conducive to bid competition. Given this, we explore whether analysts coverage of the targets affects the level of competition to buy these firms. Table 6 presents two logit models of the determinants of bid competition. The dependent variable in these tests is equal to 1 for targets that receive a public takeover offer from more than one bidder, and set to 0 otherwise. The specification in Table 6 augments that in Officer (2003) to address whether the number of analysts covering the targets deters or invites competing bidders.
The estimates in Table 6 suggest that analyst coverage of the target is associated with competing bids in takeovers: the coefficient estimates for the number of analysts' variable are significantly positive. The marginal economic impact related to a one standard deviation increase in analyst coverage implies a 1.3 to 2 percentage points increase in the probability that an alternate offer for the target emerges. This is quite a substantial effect when benchmarked against the 4.7% incidence of bid competition for the transactions in our sample (Table 1 ).
The results in Table 6 suggest that analyst coverage generates additional interest in acquiring the target firm, encouraging competition to buy these companies. The increased competition triggered by the increased coverage could explain the higher takeover premiums paid to firms with more coverage and the lower merger announcement returns earned by their acquirers. Moreover, it is possible that the increased competition to buy the target is due, at least in part, due to the target managers' ability to structure deals without committing to pay a merger termination fee (Table 5 ). Aktas, et al. (2010) argue that target firms that initiate their own acquisition signal a clear willingness to sell, thereby weakening their bargaining power during merger negotiations. However, if monitoring by analysts provides managers with powerful bargaining incentives, some of them may want to initiate the acquisition of their firms. This possibility could explain the result in Table 6 showing increased competition to acquire targets covered by more analysts. On the other hand, if the increased monitoring that comes with high analyst coverage alleviates the need for targets offer themselves up for sale, analyst coverage of the target firm may be negatively associated with the decision to initiate the acquisition.
Deal initiation
To examine these issues, in Table 7 we estimate two logit models similar to those in Aktas, et al. (2010) in which the dependent variable is set to 1 for target initiated deals, and set to 0 otherwise. We extend their specification by including the number of analysts covering the target firm as the key explanatory variable in the logit tests. The marginal effect associated with our (statistically significant) analyst coverage variables in Table 7 implies that a one standard deviation increase in the number of analysts reduces the probability that the target initiates the deal by 5.3 percentage points. The magnitude of this effect is economically important since targets initiate their own acquisition in about 39% of the transactions we study (Table 1 ).
This result is consistent with at least two non-mutually exclusive explanations. To the extent that financial analysts perform a monitoring role that improves firm operations and value, the results in Table 7 are consistent with the idea that well-monitored companies are less likely to succumb to the strategic alternative of offering themselves up for sale (which, presumably, is a last resort for many firms following periods of poor performance). Alternatively, the results in Table 7 support the notion that the firms with greater analyst coverage have enhanced investor recognition (Merton, 1987) and, therefore, are more likely to attract unsolicited takeover offers from potential suitors (as opposed to needing to invite such offers).
Robustness tests
In this section we perform different tests in order to address some issues of potential concern and examine the robustness of our findings.
Acquirers' analysts
Our results indicate that analyst coverage enhances the wealth of shareholders of firms that are sold.
Correspondingly, it is possible that analyst coverage also improves the wealth of shareholders of the acquirer firm. To evaluate this possibility, we re-run our target premium and acquirer return regressions (similar to those reported in Tables 3 and 4 , respectively) adding a variable to control for the number of analysts covering the acquirer firm. This variable is defined as the maximum number of analysts covering the acquirer company during the six months prior to the merger announcement. We present the results of these analyses in Panel A of Table 8 . To conserve space, we only report the parameter estimates for the number of analysts covering the target and also for the number of analysts covering the acquirer.
The results in Panel A of Table 8 show that our main findings are robust to the inclusion of the acquirer analysts' variable. We continue to find that the number of analysts covering the target is positively associated with the premiums paid to these firms and negatively related to the acquirers' merger announcement returns. Interestingly, we note that the number of acquirer analysts' variable has a negative and significant coefficient in the SDC premium tests. These results appear generally consistent with the findings in Chen, et al. (2014) that analyst monitoring lowers the probability that acquirer firms make valuedestroying acquisitions. However, the results in our acquirer CAR regressions are not supportive.
In untabulated tests, we also evaluate whether the number of analysts covering the acquirer changes (increases or decreases) after the acquisition and whether such change is related to the number of analysts covering the acquired target company. The results indicate that, after the merger, acquirers gain one new analyst for every two analysts covering their acquired target. To the extent that acquirers pay higher premiums to essentially "buy" more coverage it would be reasonable to assume that the additional coverage is valuable to the merged firm in the long run. To test this conjecture, we regress the acquirers' buy-andhold abnormal return (BHAR) during the year after the acquisition using the number of analysts covering the target firm as the key explanatory variable. We find that a one standard deviation increase in target analysts is associated with BHAR increases of 2.3% to 2.9% for the merged firm.
Anticipation bias
It is possible that stock prices might reflect the anticipation of a takeover premium if analyst coverage reveals that a takeover is more likely. To consider this possibility, we employ a methodology similar to that in Comment and Schwert (1995) and decompose the number of analyst covering the target into variables related to the anticipated and surprise components of analyst coverage. These components are estimates from the target analyst coverage regression reported in model (4) of Panel C of Table 2 . The predictable component is the fitted value of target analyst coverage from that regression and the surprise component is the residual.
In Panel B of Table 8 , we report abbreviated premium regressions (similar to those reported in Table   3 ) in which the main explanatory variables are the anticipated and surprise components of the number of analysts covering the target. The coefficients for both variables are positive and statistically significant.
These results, which suggest that the benefits of analyst coverage are not fully imputed in the value of the firm before the takeover, mitigate the concern that investors are able to anticipate takeovers of firms with greater analyst coverage. Moreover, since the residual measures abnormal or excess analyst coverage which is purged from its determinants, the positive coefficient on the surprise component variables indicates that more analyst coverage is associated with substantially higher premiums.
Alternative identification
Yu (2008) finds that firms followed by more analysts manage their earnings less. His findings are also consistent with the hypothesis that analysts perform an external monitoring role. To tackle endogeneity, Yu uses the change in brokerage size as an instrumental variable for the number of analysts covering the firm.
To rationalize this choice, Yu argues that the size of brokerage houses changes over time because it depends on changes in profits and revenues. As an example, Yu mentions that Lehman Brothers reported a $966 million net operating loss in 1990, which triggered a reduction in the number of firms that Lehman's analysts covered. Yu argues that such drop created an exogenous shock to coverage. Yet, since Lehman continued covering some firms, it is possible that the firms that lost coverage were not randomly dropped.
Under this possibility, the change in analyst coverage triggered by brokerage size changes might not be really exogenous. With this caveat in mind and following Yu (2008) , we employ 2SLS methods and use the change in size of brokerage houses during the year before the merger announcement as an instrument to fit the number of analysts covering targets in our sample. We then use this fitted variable in second stage tests of target premium and acquirer announcement returns, respectively. 10 The abbreviated results appear in Panel C of Table 8 .
Using the alternative instrumentation proposed in Yu (2008) to fit analyst coverage for our target firms does not alter our results. The estimates in Panel C of Table 8 also document that the fitted variable for the number of target analysts is positively related to premiums and negatively associated with the acquirer announcement returns.
Division of gains
Our bid premium regressions in tandem with our acquirer return tests indicate that targets covered by more analysts seem to get bigger "piece of the acquisition pie" for their shareholders. To evaluate this issue in more detail, we follow the procedure in Ahern (2012) . Specifically, in Panel D of Table 8 Table 8 are similar to those in Table 4 .
However, to conserve space, we only report coefficient estimates for the variable tracking the number of analysts.
The regressions in Panel D show that targets with more coverage get a relatively higher share of the gains. The economic effect related to the coefficients implies a 33 basis points increase in the relative gain of the target vs. the acquirer per dollar of total market value of the target and the acquirer.
Log transformation and lagged coverage
To further evaluate the robustness of our results, we use several alternate ways to examine analyst coverage. For example, following Hong, et al. (2000) we compute the natural log of (1+ number of analysts covering the target). In (untabulated) analyses, we re-estimate our target premium and acquirer return tests using this transformation as the key explanatory variable. The inferences arising from these tests are very similar to those tabulated. The coefficient estimates for the log-transformed variable imply that doubling the number of analysts is associated with a 3.5% to 5.4% percentage point increase in the 4-week SDC premium. Likewise, adding one more analyst to cover a target that is already covered by two other analysts is related to an SDC premium increase of 3.2%. We also find that increasing the number of analysts by one standard deviation is related to a 0.8% to 1.0% decline in the CAR meeting the acquirer firms upon deal announcement.
We also repeat our premium and acquirer return tests using a variable that lags analysts' coverage by two years. The results using the number of analysts covering the targets two years before deal announcement are consistent with those tabulated. The lagged coverage variable attains positive and significant coefficients (0.020, p-value = 0.009 and 0.016, p-value = 0.057) in the SDC premium regressions. Likewise, the estimates are positive and significant (0.019, p-value = 0.000 and 0.020, p-value = 0.000) in the Schwert (1996) premium regressions. In contrast, the coefficient for lagged coverage are significant and negative in the acquirer CAR regressions (-0.001, p-value = 0.013). These results reduce concerns that coverage is augmented or initiated by analysts that anticipate acquisitions.
Agreement amongst analysts
Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) find that for stocks with unfavorable quantitative characteristics, higher consensus recommendations are associated with worse subsequent returns. They argue that the level of the consensus recommendations among sell-side analysts adds value only among stocks with favorable quantitative characteristics (i.e., value stocks and positive momentum stocks). Given the results in Jegadeesh, et al. (2004) it is possible that agreement amongst analysts (or the lack thereof) affects our reported findings. To address this issue, we re-estimate our premium and acquirer return regressions in the subsample of 746 transactions in which the target has analyst coverage while controlling for the degree of agreement among the covering analysts.
Specifically, we define an indicator variable equal to 1 when more than half of the analysts covering the target issue a "sell" recommendation during the six-month period prior to the acquisition announcement (and 0 otherwise). All of our results prove robust to the inclusion of this control variable. 11 Parameter estimates for the number of analysts' variable continue to be positive and significant in the SDC (0.014 and 0.008) and Schwert (0.009 and 0.008) premium regressions. The analysts' agreement variable, however, does not achieve statistical significance in any of the specifications. Likewise, the coefficient for the number of analysts is negative and significant in our acquirer return regressions (-0.003, p-value = 0.000). In contrast, in the same tests the coefficient on the analysts' agreement control variable is not statistically significant.
Analysts from investment banks
SDC regularly reports league tables (see, for example, Rau 2000) ranking investment advisors in completed M&A deals. We use this information to evaluate whether our results are robust to controls for (i) the rank (quality) of the investment advisor and (ii) the affiliation of a target analyst to an investment bank advising the target firm.
11 In the premium tests the analyst agreement control variable does not attain statistically significant estimates. However, it attains significantly positive estimates in the acquirer return regressions. Coefficients range between 0.009 and 0.015 and p-values are significant at the 1% level.
Following a procedure similar to that in Rau (2000), we create an indicator which we set to 1 if the advisor is ranked as a top 10 advisor (on the basis of the value of transactions advised) by SDC. The indicator is set to 0 for all other advisors. Advisors are ranked in purchases of at least 50% of the target company, repurchases, self-tender offers, exchange offers for equity and/or securities convertible into equity, and leveraged recapitalizations. They are not ranked in partial acquisitions of less than 50% of the target, in ownership interests valued at less than $1 million, or in splitoffs. Advisors receive full credit for each transaction in which they advise either the target or the acquirer firm.
We also construct an indicator variable equal to 1 if an analyst covering the target belongs to an investment bank that is identified as the target's lead advisor in the transaction. Otherwise, the indicator takes the value of 0. SDC classifies a firm as a financial advisor if it acts as dealer manager, serves as lead or junior underwriter, provides financial advice, issues a fairness opinion, initiates the deal or represents shareholders, board of directors, seller, major holder or claimants. Firms that act as equity participants or arrange deal financing are not classified as advisors.
The results from untabulated empirical analyses indicate that including the analyst rank and the affiliated-analyst as additional control variables to our target merger premium and acquirer announcement return regressions does not alter the significance or inferences related to the number of target analysts' independent variables.
Conclusions
In this paper, we examine whether financial analysts play a monitoring role during acquisitions. Our results indicate that firms covered by more analysts are sold for larger premiums, are less likely to pay termination fees, are more likely to be targeted by more than one acquirer, and are less likely to initiate their own takeover. In addition, we also find that acquirer returns upon the announcement of a deal decrease in the number of analysts covering the target firms. In general, we find that targets covered by more analysts obtain a larger share of the gains in a takeover.
From an econometric perspective, the potential for coverage selection bias and omitted variables raise valid concerns with our baseline empirical tests. Moreover, our baseline results indicate that being covered by more analysts enhances the wealth of shareholders in firms that become takeover targets. However, our baseline tests do not directly reveal whether losing such coverage is detrimental. To address these issues, we use natural experiments involving brokerage houses that merge or close to instrument for coverage loss in the context of 2SLS analyses. Specifically, we use these models to evaluate the causal relationship between analyst coverage and acquisition gains of the parties to the transactions. Our results related to these natural experiments as the source for identification indicate that, in deals involving target firms that lose analyst coverage, target premiums decrease and acquirer merger announcement returns increase. Aside from withstanding concerns related to endogeneity and selection, we note that our findings are also robust to a battery of supplementary tests that include numerous additional controls, and an alternative source of identification.
Overall, the empirical evidence supports our monitoring hypothesis that, under the oversight from financial analysts, managers of takeover targets have the incentive to bargain for better deal terms which create substantial value for their shareholders. In this vein, our findings suggest that analysts perform an external monitoring role that enhances the wealth of shareholders of firms that become takeover targets. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) . In addition, we require that both acquirer and target firms have stock market, accounting, and analyst coverage data available from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Compustat, and I/B/E/S, respectively. In Panel A we report the temporal and Fama and French 12 industrial distribution of the targets. In Panel B we report present summary statistics for key characteristics for the sample of 1,098 targets. The Appendix provides definitions for all variables used in this paper. [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , and the date on which the event occurs. Panel A also reports the number of firms that lose analyst coverage due to the event (Coverage Loss) and the number of target firms in our sample that lose coverage (Sample Loss). Brokerage mergers are identified in Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) and brokerage closures are identified in Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) . Panel B provides sample statistics of the 746 covered target firms sorted by whether they lose coverage due to the events reported in Panel A at least six months prior to the acquisition announcement. Panel C provides year and industry fixed-effects logistic regression estimates of the probability of losing coverage. In these tests we analyze 47,881 firm-year observations during our sample period with stock market, accounting, and analyst data from CRSP, Compustat, and I/B/E/S, respectively. The dependent variable is set to one if a firm coverage decreases during the calendar year and set to zero otherwise. We compute this variable for each company in every calendar year in which the firm is still active as of the December 31 st of the calendar year. Firms that drop from the sample at any time before this date are removed from the analysis. The Appendix provides the definition for all control variables. We report p-values in parenthesis. (2), (5), and (6) is the premium reported by SDC. The dependent variable in the remaining models is the premium computed as in Schwert (1996) . The main independent variable is the number of analysts covering the target firm. Models (5)-(8) report 2 nd stage regressions in which coverage loss is instrumented using a 1 st stage OLS regression similar to model (4) in Panel C of Table 2 . Additional controls include all of the independent variables used in model (1) of Panel C in Table 2 . The estimates from some (but not all) of these additional variables are tabulated. We report p-values in parenthesis.
SDC 4-week Premium
Schwert ( Regressions of the acquirer's cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over three days around the merger announcement date. Our tests are specified as in Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) . The main independent variable is the number of analysts covering the target firm. In columns (3) and (4) we report acquirer CAR 2 nd stage regressions in which the coverage loss is instrumented using a 1 st stage OLS regression similar to model (4) in Panel C of Table 2 . Additional controls include all of the independent variables used in model (1) of Panel C in Table 2 . The estimates from some (but not all) of these additional variables are tabulated. We report p-values in parenthesis. In this table we report regressions explaining the probability of a merger agreement containing a target-payable termination fee. The coefficients reported in columns 1 and 2 are from logit regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the acquisition involves a target-payable termination fee, and zero otherwise. Columns 3 and 4 report OLS regressions of the target termination fee percentage (termination fee scaled by the target market value). The regressions are specified as in Officer (2003) . The key explanatory variable is the number of sellside analysts covering the target firm. All variables are defined in the Appendix. We report p-values in parentheses. In this table we report logit regressions of bid competition probability. The dependent variable equals one if the target receives an offer from more than one bidder, and zero otherwise. The regressions are specified following Officer (2003) . The key independent variable is the number of sell-side analysts covering the target firm. All variables are defined in the Appendix. We report p-values in parentheses.
OLS

Logit
(1) In Panel A, we re-estimate the premium and acquirer return regressions to control for the number of analysts covering the acquirer firms during the six month before the merger announcement. In Panel B, we decompose the number of analysts covering the target firm into predicted and surprise components and use these as the key explanatory variables specified similar to those in Table 3 . In Panel C we use a different fitted variable of target analysts' coverage to rerun second stage regressions of target premiums and acquirer merger announcement returns, respectively. The first stage OLS regression analyzes the same sample in Panel C of Table 4 except that we replace the brokerage closure and brokerage acquired variables in that regression with a change in brokerage size variable and the dependent variable is now the maximum number of analysts covering the firm during the calendar year. In Panel D we study the division of gains of the target relative to the acquirer firm using the method proposed by Ahern (2012) . 
